No. 08-0719
Crim.
App.
No. 1275
UNITED
STATES,
Appellee,
v.
WEBSTER M. SMITH, CADET, U.S. COAST GUARD,
Appellant,
Argued: November
10, 2009
Decided: March 29, 2010
[68 M.J. 445]
[446] STUCKY,
J.,
delivered the judgment of the Court, in which RYAN, J.,
joined. BAKER, J., filed a separate opinion concurring in
the result.
ERDMANN, J.,
filed a separate opinion concurring in
part and dis- senting in part, in
which EFFRON, C.J., joined.
* * *
Judge STUCKY delivered
the judgment of the Court.
At trial, the military judge
limited Appellant’s cross-examination of Cadet SR, the Government’s only witness on his three convictions related
to sexual mis- conduct. We granted review to decide whether Appel- lant was denied his
right to confront his accuser on
2a
those three
specifications. We hold that Appellant was not denied his right to confront his
accuser, and affirm.
I.
A
general court-martial
consisting
of members con- victed Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of attempting to
disobey an order, going from his place of duty, sodomy, extortion,
and indecent assault. Articles 80, 86, 125, 127, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 886, 925, 927, 934 (2006). The conven- ing authority approved the sentence the members ad- judged: a
dismissal, confinement for six months,
and
forfeiture of all pay and allowances. The United States Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
on April 9, 2008.
United States v. Smith, 66 M.J. 556, 563 (C.G. Ct. Crim.
App.
2008). Appellant filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 14, 2008.
Appellant petitioned this
Court for review
on July 14, 2008.
II.
As a preliminary matter, the Government contends
that Appellant’s
petition for review
was not timely
filed, and that therefore the grant of review should be dismissed as improvidently granted. Article 67(b),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (2006),
provides that an ac- cused has sixty days to petition this Court for review from the earlier of “(1) the date on which
the accused
is notified of the decision of the Court of Criminal Ap- peals; or (2) the date
on which a copy of the decision …, after being served on appellate counsel
of record for the accused
… is deposited in the United States mails for delivery by first class certified mail to the accused.” In United States v. Rodriguez, we held that the sixty-day statutory
period for filing petitions for review
was ju-
3a
risdictional and could not be waived. 67 M.J. 110, 116 (C.A.A.F. 2009).
Before filing
a petition for review at this
Court,
Appellant timely sought reconsideration of the CCA’s decision. Until the CCA rendered a decision on the re- consideration request, either by denying reconsidera- tion or by granting
reconsideration
and rendering a new decision, there was no CCA decision for [447] this Court to review.
We hold that Appellant’s sixty-day period for
filing at this Court began on the date the de-
fense
was formally notified,
under the provisions of Ar- ticle 67(b), UCMJ,
of the CCA’s decision on reconsid- eration. The evidence of record does
not support the Government’s contention that the appeal was untimely filed.
III.
Appellant and Cadet SR were cadets
at the United
States
Coast
Guard Academy. During the summer of 2005,
Cadet SR and Appellant were assigned to neighboring
Coast Guard
cutters in Norfolk,
Virginia. While there,
Cadet
SR committed an indiscretion
that could have jeopardized
her ranking
as a cadet and threatened her Coast Guard career.
Shortly thereafter, Appellant sent her a text message saying that he hoped
the rumors he was hearing were not true. Cadet SR
discussed the situation with Appellant but lied about some of
the details. Appellant
“said he’d try to squash
rumors, and that it would be okay.”
In October of
that year, after both had returned to the Academy, Appellant notified Cadet SR
that
the rumors were
persisting. She then truthfully dis-
closed the details of her indiscretion.
Appellant
said he would continue to
try to
suppress the ru- mors, but that he needed motivation to do so. Ap-
4a
pellant denied
he
was seeking sexual
favors but suggested the couple take a photograph of them- selves naked together to build “trust
in one an- other.”
After the photo, Appellant left but re- turned to her room later that evening. On this oc- casion, he inserted his fingers in her
vagina and placed his
tongue on her clitoris. Cadet SR then performed fellatio on him.
IV.
Appellant alleged that Cadet SR’s
indiscretion in- volved engaging in sex with an enlisted member and, pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412(c)(1), Appellant
moved to admit evidence of this prior sexual conduct.
That
rule provides
that “[e]vidence offered
to prove that any alleged victim en-
gaged in other sexual behavior” is
not generally admis- sible. M.R.E. 412(a)(1). However, “evidence the exclu-sion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the accused” is admissible. M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C).
During a closed hearing
conducted pursuant to M.R.E. 412(c)(2), Appellant testified that in May 2005
Cadet SR told him that she had had nonconsensual sex- ual encounters with
an enlisted
member, but that in Oc- tober 2005 she admitted that those sexual encounters had actually been consensual. Cadet SR invoked her
right against self-incrimination
and did not testify at the hearing. Appellant argued
that he should
be al- lowed to question Cadet SR about the encounters for
“the specific purpose of establishing a pattern of lying about sexual events.”
The military judge sustained
the Government’s ob- jection to the admission of this evidence, but allowed the “members [to] be informed that [Cadet SR’s] secret was information that if revealed could have an adverse
5a
impact on her Coast Guard career,
including possibly disciplinary action under the UCMJ.” The CCA af-
firmed this decision. Smith, 66 M.J. at 560-61. Appel- lant asserts that the military judge erred in not admit- ting the sexual nature of
Cadet
SR’s indiscretion, and requests that we set aside his convictions for
extortion, sodomy, and indecent
acts.
V.
The
Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all crimi- nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. Const. amend
VI. The right to confrontation includes the
right of a military accused to cross-examine ad- verse witnesses.
See United States v. Clayton, 67
M.J. 283, 287 (C.A.A.F. 2009). Uncovering and presenting to
court members “a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function
of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (citation omitted).
“Through
cross-examination, an accused
can ‘expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors … could appropriately
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’
” [448] United States
v. Collier, 67 M.J. 347,
352 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
Typically, we review a military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See
United States v. Weston, 67
M.J. 390, 392 (C.A.A.F. 2009). We have also applied the abuse of discretion standard to alleged violations
of the Sixth
Amendment
Confrontation
Clause. United States
v. Moss, 63 M.J. 233,
236 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Israel, 60 M.J. 485, 488 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
Appellant has the burden under M.R.E.
412 of es-
tablishing his entitlement to any exception
to the pro-
6a
hibition on the admission of
evidence “offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual con- duct.” United
States v. Banker, 607 M.J. 216, 218,
223 (C.A.A.F.
2004) (citation omitted). To establish
that the excluded
evidence “would violate the constitutional rights of the accused,” M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C), an accused
must demonstrate that the evidence is relevant, mate- rial, and favorable to his defense, “and thus whether it is ‘necessary.’ ” Id. at 222 (quoting United States v. Williams, 37 M.J. 352, 361 (C.M.A. 1993). The term “ ‘favorable’ ” as used in both Supreme Court and mili- tary precedent is
synonymous with “ ‘vital.’
” Id.
(quot- ing United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
867 (1982);
United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1, 8 (C.M.A.
1983)).
Appellant contends that his inability to cross- examine
Cadet SR
about the nature of the secret af- fected his convictions for sodomy, extortion, and com- mitting an indecent
act. We conclude
that further cross-examination
of Cadet SR
was not “constitution- ally required.” Assuming arguendo that the exact na- ture of the indiscretion—that
it
involved consensual sexual relations with
an enlisted member—was rele- vant,
it was
neither material nor
vital to Appellant’s defense.
Testimony is material if it was “ ‘of consequence to the determination of’ appellant’s
guilt.” Dorsey, 16 M.J. at 6
(quoting M.R.E. 401).
In determining
whether evi- dence is
of consequence to the determination of Appel- lant’s guilt, we “consider the importance of the issue for
which the evidence was offered in relation to
the other issues in this case; the
extent to which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of other evidence in the case pertaining to
this issue.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, the evidence was offered on a significant issue, the
7a
alleged victim’s credibility, which was in dispute. Nev- ertheless,
knowledge of the exact nature of her indis- cretion in relation
to the other issues
in the case was not important. The military judge allowed Appellant to
present a fairly precise and plausible theory of bias, i.e., that she lied to preserve a secret which “if
revealed could have an adverse impact
on her Coast Guard
ca-
reer, including possibly disciplinary action under the UCMJ.” While Cadet SR’s
credibility was in conten- tion, it is unclear why the lurid
nuances of her sexual past
would have added much to Appellant’s extant the- ory of fabrication.
Nor is cross-examining Cadet SR
about her
sexual past “ ‘vital’ ” under Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867; Dorsey, 16
M.J. at
8). The “vital”
issue is not whether Cadet
SR engaged in consensual sex with an enlisted
member or
whether she lied to Appellant about
it, but rather
whether she lied about an important issue that would impeach her credibility. Cadet SR admitted that she had been in
a “situation” that could have jeopardized
her career and her ranking as a cadet; that the “situation” was in
viola- tion of cadet regulations and
possibly a violation of the UCMJ; and that she initially lied to Appellant about the “situation.” All of this was before the members.
The military judge did not abuse
his discretion; he provided
Appellant what he was due under the Confrontation Clause: an opportunity to
impeach the complainant’s credibility.
Finally, Appellant argues that Cadet SR’s past in- discretion and her lies about it
gave her similar
motive to lie
about her relationship
with Appellant.
We de- cline to embrace such
a broad, cumulative reading
of M.R.E. 412 and its case law. Even according to Appel- lant’s own theory, Cadet SR lied about her sexual past
8a
to protect
herself, not a [449] relationship with another, unlike United States v. Williams,
37 M.J. 352 (C.M.A. 1993), or
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). This is not a case like Collier in which the appellant asserted she was framed for larceny by her gay lover after the breakup
of the relationship. 67 M.J. at 351. Nor does
this case involve recent extramarital sex or rejection and invective which might have caused the victim to
falsely claim rape, as in
Dorsey, 16 M.J. at 6. To the ex- tent Appellant might have tried to introduce some non- sexual aspects
of his theory of bias via M.R.E.
608(c),
he failed to frame or raise this issue as such at trial.
VI.
The decision of the United
States Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals is
affirmed.
BAKER,
Judge (concurring in the result):
I concur in the result.
In my view, this case is gov- erned by United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2004). In Banker, we concluded
that in the context of
Military Rule
of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412, it
is “within the judge’s discretion
to determine that such a cursory argument [does]
not sufficiently articulate how the testimony
reasonably
established a motive to fabri- cate…. [It is]
within
the discretion of the military
judge to conclude that the offered testimony was not relevant.” Id. at
225. The burden is on the appellant to
prove
why the M.R.E. 412 prohibition should
be lifted. Id.
Appellant’s theory of admission was that SR, hav- ing
lied to Appellant about her prior sexual misconduct with an enlisted
member of the Coast Guard, demon-
strated a propensity to lie about her sex life generally and in particular to make false allegations to law en-
9a
forcement authorities to conceal her own sexual mis- conduct. Appellant argues that SR’s misconduct also included engaging
in consensual sexual activities with Appellant in
the
Cadet barracks. Therefore, Appellant argues,
he had a constitutional right to cross-examine SR
about
her prior sexual conduct, notwithstanding the general
prohibition on such examination enshrined
in M.R.E. 412.
The problem for Appellant
is that his theory of ad- mission
is
too far-fetched to pass constitutional and M.R.E. 403 muster. First, SR had no obligation to tell Appellant about her sexual life and misconduct. It does not logically follow
that someone who would lie to pro- tect her privacy from a probing acquaintance would lie to the police and commit
perjury. Second, it
was SR herself who reported her sexual contact with Appel- lant; this cuts against
Appellant’s theory that SR would lie to conceal her own misconduct. Third, to support this theory of admission the members needed to know that SR had “lied” to Appellant about her sexual mis- conduct; they did not
need to
know the details
of the prior
sexual conduct. This much the military
judge permitted.
In my view, Appellant might have a different ap- pellate case if
he had argued to this Court that mem- bers needed to know the nature of “the secret” in order to
assess beyond a reasonable doubt
whether SR might succumb to
pressure to protect the secret. This alter- native theory was not the basis of Appellant’s appeal before
this Court. In any event, it should be noted that the military judge rejected
this theory at trial,
his con- clusions of law stating:
While the importance of her secret would be relevant in this fashion, I do not think that the
10a
members would need to know the specifics. At the Article 39(a) session, the Government of- fered a generic formulation that would impress upon the members the seriousness of the se- cret. In essence, the members could be in- formed that the secret was information that if revealed
could have an adverse impact on her Coast Guard career,
including possibly discipli-
nary
action under the UCMJ.
Reasonable judges might
disagree on whether ad-
ditional detail about “the secret” was needed for mem- bers to fairly assess
whether this Coast Guard cadet
was coerced into sexual conduct to safeguard that se- cret. But I am not persuaded that it was plain error. The military
judge
informed the members that the se- cret exposed the witness
to criminal liability and vio- lated academy regulations. This is the very sort of bal- ancing military judges are supposed to
conduct [450] when they weigh an accused’s rights and a victim’s pri- vacy under
M.R.E. 412.
ERDMANN, Judge, with whom EFFRON, Chief
Judge, joins (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
While I concur with the majority opinion as to the jurisdictional issue raised by the Government,
I re- spectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion as to the granted issue. In a case where credibility of the complainant was fundamental, the military judge pre- vented the defense
from presenting to the panel an ex- planation of the circumstances that would have pro- vided a motive for the complainant to
make
a false alle-
gation of rape.
11a
Background
Cadet Webster
Smith was initially charged with twenty-two specifications, the majority of which re- lated to his sexual relationships
with female cadets
at the United States Coast Guard
Academy. Eleven of those charges
were dismissed before trial.
At a general court-martial composed of members, Smith was found not guilty of six of the remaining charges. Contrary to his pleas, the members found him guilty of absence without leave, attempted failure to obey a lawful order, sodomy, extortion, and indecent assault. The sodomy, extortion, and indecent
assault charges
arose
out of al- legations made by SR, a female
cadet.
In
this
appeal, Smith
asserts
that the military judge
erred by preventing him from fully
cross-
examining SR as to her motive and credibility in viola- tion of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
and the “constitutionally required” exception to Military
Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412. M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C). At trial the defense filed a motion pursuant to M.R.E. 412 requesting permission to cross-examine SR about her alleged
statements to Smith concerning a prior sexual encounter
she had with an enlisted
servicemem- ber. The factual basis for the motion was summarized by the military judge in
his findings of fact:
During the summer training program at the start
of their first class year, Cadet Smith and [SR] were
both assigned to patrol boats that moored at
Station Little Creek.
Both
lived in barracks rooms at the Station. In May 2005, Cadet Smith approached [SR] to inform her that he was hearing rumors from the
enlisted personnel
assigned to the Station
that
she had
a sexual encounter with an enlisted
12a
member assigned to the Station. [SR] told him that this was true, but that it
was not a consen- sual encounter. Cadet Smith then informed the enlisted personnel who were spreading the ru- mors that the conduct was not consensual.
On or about 19 October 2005, Cadet Smith again approached [SR]. He told her that he had remained
in contact with some of the enlisted personnel assigned to Station Little Creek and that the rumors
surrounding
her sexual en- counter with the enlisted man had
continued. This
time she told him that the incident
with the enlisted man had been a consensual encoun- ter and that the scope of the encounter had
been greater than she
had previously
de- scribed.
At the Article 32 hearing, [SR]
merely stated that she had confided
a secret to Cadet Smith. In her 15 February
2006
statement, she merely stated that a
situation occurred which
led to rumors. On both occasions, she went on to state that on October
19th,
she was con- cerned enough that Cadet Smith would expose this secret that she agreed to
pose for a picture with him in which both of them were nude, and later that night allowed him to perform cunni- lingus on her then she performed fellatio on him.
In the defense motion,
Smith argued that the evi- dence was constitutionally required because “[t]he fact that the alleged victim lied to Cadet Smith about her sexual activity and has misled CGIS about that activity tends to show the alleged victim as untruthful about her sexual conduct generally and specifically has mo-
13a
tive to
lie about the specific sexual rumors underlying the charge—the very issue before the trier of fact.”
The Government
opposed the admission of
the evi- dence arguing that the substance
of SR’s secret was not relevant,
material, or vital to Smith’s defense.
In deny- ing the motion the military judge concluded
that: [451] while the evidence was relevant, the members did not need to know the specifics, but could be provided with a non-specific summary;1 although the evidence
could
show that SR had a propensity to bring false accusa- tions against men with whom she had consensual sexual encounters, the evidence
was not strong
since the source of the allegation, Smith, was biased;
there was a significant
difference between SR making a false alle- gation to Smith and making a false allegation to law en- forcement
authorities; and the
probative value of
the evidence
was outweighed
by
the
danger of unfair
prejudice.
The United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the findings
and sentence.
United States v. Smith, 66 M.J. 556, 563 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App.
2008). We review a military judge’s decision to
admit
or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Ayala,
43 M.J. 296, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995).
In doing so, we review findings
of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard and conclusions of law under the de novo standard. Id.
1 The military judge found that “the members
could be
in- formed that the secret was information that if revealed could have an adverse impact on [SR’s] Coast Guard career, including possi- bly disciplinary action under the UCMJ.”
14a
Discussion
The evidence at
issue was proffered to attack SR’s
credibility by establishing that she had earlier made a false allegation of a nonconsensual sexual encounter to protect her Coast Guard career.
Before addressing the M.R.E. 412 issue, it is worth noting that there is some question
as to whether M.R.E. 412 even applies
to this type of evidence. The Drafters’ Analysis to M.R.E. 412 states “[e]vidence of
past
false complaints of sexual of- fenses by an alleged
victim of a sexual offense is
not within the
scope of this Rule
and is
not
objectionable
when otherwise admissible.” Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence
app. 22 at A22-36 (2008 ed.).2 However, given the posture of this case on appeal,
and assuming that M.R.E. 412 does apply, the evidence is
clearly ad- missible under the M.R.E. 412 analysis.
1. Objections Under M.R.E. 412
“[A] criminal
defendant
states a violation of
the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohib- ited from engaging
in
otherwise appropriate
cross- examination
designed
to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‘to expose to
the jury the facts from which jurors … could appro- priately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
680 (1986) (citing Davis
v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 318 (1974)). “[E]xposure of a witness’ motivation in
testify-
2 See also Fed.
R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note on pro- posed 1994 amendment (“Evidence offered to prove allegedly false
prior claims by the victim is not barred by Rule 412.
However, the evidence is subject to the requirements of Rule 404.”).
15a
ing is a proper and important
function
of the constitu- tionally
protected right of cross-examination.” Id. At
678-79. “The question is
whether ‘[a] reasonable jury might have received
a significantly different
impression of
[the witness’s] credibility
had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line
of cross-examination.’” United States
v. Collier,
67 M.J. 347,
352 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (brackets
in original) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680).
“M.R.E.
412 was intended to protect victims of sex- ual offenses from the degrading and embarrassing dis- closure of intimate details
of their private lives
while preserving the constitutional rights of the accused to present
a defense.” United States v. Banker, 60 M.J.
216, 219 (C.A.A.F 2004). There are, however, three ex- ceptions to the exclusionary provisions of M.R.E.
412.
Smith relied on the
third exception that requires the admission of evidence “the
exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the accused.”
M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C).
“This
exception addresses an ac- cused’s
Sixth
Amendment right
of confrontation and Fifth Amendment
right to a fair trial.” Banker, 60 M.J. at 221 (citations
omitted)
(emphasis added). Banker requires that “where
evidence [452]
is offered pursuant
to this exception, it is important for defense counsel to detail
an accused’s theory of relevance
and constitu-tional necessity.” 60 M.J. at 221. Smith’s counsel did just that in this case.
2. Relevance and Materiality
In order to properly
determine whether evidence is
admissible under the constitutionally
required excep- tion the military judge must evaluate whether
the prof- fered evidence is
relevant, material, and favorable to the defense.
Id. at 222. “[T]he relevancy portion of this
16a
test is the same as
that employed for the other two ex- ceptions of the rule,” which is that “[e]vidence is rele- vant if it has ‘any
tendency to make the existence of any fact … more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.’
M.R.E.
401.”
Id. At 222. The proffered evidence could have impacted SR’s
credibility by allowing the defense to provide a com-
monsense explanation for SR
to give false testimony.
That is, when SR
learned of the investigation of Smith for alleged sexual
offenses, she became concerned that the investigation would produce allegations that she had engaged in prohibited sexual activity3 with Smith in their dormitory at the
Coast Guard Academy, thereby
jeopardizing
her own career. Thus, she fabri-
cated
the charges against Smith to protect her career, as she had in the past
for the same reason. The military judge found that the evidence would be relevant
and I
agree.
Having
found
the evidence relevant, the next step for the military judge was to determine whether the evidence was “material
and favorable
to the accused’s
defense, and
thus whether it is ‘necessary’
” Id.
at 222 (citing United States v.
Williams,
37 M.J. 352, 361 (C.M.A. 1993)).
In determining whether evidence is material, the military judge looks at “the
importance of the issue for which the evidence was offered in
relation to the other issues in this case; the ex- tent to which this issue is in dispute;
and the
3 Pursuant to Regulations for the Code of
Cadets 4-5-05.a.3, sexual conduct is prohibited on Coast Guard Academy installations
even if
it is between consenting cadets. Cadets found guilty of con- sensual sexual misconduct can be disenrolled.
Id. at 4-5-05.a.4.
17a
nature of the other evidence in the case per- taining to this issue.”
Id. (quoting
United States
v. Colon-Angueira, 16 M.J. 20, 26 (C.M.A.
1983)).
There
can be no dispute
that testing
the credibility of a witness
through cross-examination is crucial to
the right of confrontation.
A more particular attack on the witness’ credi- bility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward
revealing
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personali- ties in the case at hand.
The partiality of a wit- ness is
subject
to exploration at trial, and is
“always relevant
as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of
his testimony.” 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the expo- sure of a witness’
motivation in testifying is a
proper and important function of the constitu- tionally
protected right of cross-examination.
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (citation
omit- ted).
As in United
States
v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1, 7 (C.M.A. 1983), this was
a “he said-she said” case and for the charges at issue in this appeal,4 the critical question
for the members was the credibility of the sole prosecution witness. Evidence of a motive to fabricate and that SR
had alleged that an earlier consensual sexual encounter was nonconsensual
in an attempt to protect her career
4 Sodomy, extortion, and
indecent assault.
18a
bears directly on SR’s credibility as to the allegations
she made against Smith.
It may have shown that SR had a propensity to
lie about consensual sexual encoun- ters when her career was on the line.
The materiality of this evidence is not the “lurid nuances of the victim’s sexual past” as noted by the majority, but rather the allegation that SR had previously lied about a sexual
encounter under similar circumstances. [453]
3. Balancing
Once the military
judge has
determined that the proffered
evidence is
relevant and material,
the
mili- tary judge must undertake the M.R.E. 412 balancing test to determine if the evidence is favorable to the ac- cused’s defense.5 Banker, 60 M.J. at 222. The term fa- vorable is synonymous with vital. Id.
“[W]hen balanc- ing the probative value of the evidence
against the danger of unfair
prejudice under M.R.E. 412, the mili- tary judge must consider …
factors such as confusion
of the issues,
misleading the members, undue
delay, waste of
time, needless presentation of
cumulative
evidence, [and] also
prejudice to the victim’s legitimate privacy
5 Commentators have
noted that the “constitutionally re- quired” exception may be unnecessary since once it is established that the evidence is constitutionally required, there can be no fur- ther limitation on its admission. See 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Military Rules of Evidence Manual § 412.02[4], at 4-194 (6th ed. 2006) (“Any limitation on a constitutional
right
would be disre-
garded
whether or not such a Rule existed.”); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:81, at 306 (3d ed. 2007) (“The exception is arguably unnecessary because Fed. R. Evid. 412 is subordinate to the Constitution anyway, but perhaps including it diminishes the sense of conflict between the two legal standards.”).
19a
interests.”
Id. at
223. The
M.R.E. 412
balancing test weighs in Smith’s favor.
Under the circumstances
of this case, any risk
of confusion of the issues, misleading the members, wasting time, or presenting
cumulative evidence was minimal and is
outweighed by the high probative value of this evidence.
In Dorsey the court found evidence favorable when it “undermined the credibility of the sole prosecution witness who directly testified to appellant’s guilt of the charged offense.” Dorsey, 16 M.J. at 7. In
a similar fashion, admission of a prior false allegation of
a non- consensual
sexual encounter could have
undermined the credibility of SR,
the only witness who testified against Smith on the extortion, sodomy, and indecent assault charges.
While the evidence of SR’s earlier allegation of a false nonconsensual
sexual encounter
and her subse- quent admission that
the encounter was consensual would have impacted
her privacy interests, withholding this constitutionally required evidence from the panel deprived
Smith of his best opportunity to provide a mo- tive for SR’s allegations
and to
challenge her credibil- ity.
The fact that the military judge allowed the panel to hear that SR had a secret that,
if revealed could have an adverse impact on her Coast Guard career, including possibly disciplinary action under the UCMJ, was sim- ply not sufficient. With this limited information
about SR’s secret, the members were left to speculate whether the secret
was a minor disciplinary infraction or
a more
serious
charge, but they had no idea that the
20a
proffered evidence directly implicated SR’s motive and credibility.6
In Collier this
court
found the military judge erred in limiting
cross-examination of the complaining wit- ness for possible bias. Collier, 67 M.J. at 349. There, the defendant attempted to establish
bias by present- ing evidence of the existence of
a romantic
relationship that ended badly between the accused and the com- plaining witness. Id. at 351. The military judge only allowed
cross-examination as to the “breakup of a friendship.” Id. at
351-52. This court found that there was a qualitative difference
between the two situations and if
the members had been shown evidence of the romantic relationship they might have had
a
signifi- cantly
different impression of the accusing witness’ credibility. Id. at 352, 353.
Similarly, there is
a qualita-
tive difference between
an
undisclosed situation
that “could have had
an adverse impact on [SR’s] Coast Guard career” and an allegation that SR had previously made
a false allegation of a nonconsensual sexual en- counter to protect her career.
[454] While the military
judge
found that the evi- dence was not strong because it
came
from Smith, who had an obvious bias, it is well established that “[t]he weight and credibility of the … witness are matters for
6 Trial counsel illustrated
the range of incidents that the members could have speculated on when,
at one point
during his argument on the motion, he stated that while the existence of the secret
was extremely relevant, the content of the secret was not. Trial counsel argued, “[t]he extortion charge is that there was a secret.
It doesn’t matter if that secret was whether she
liked Smarties.
It doesn’t matter if she had committed some other fel- ony ….”
21a
the members
alone to decide.” United States v. Moss,
63 M.J. 233, 239 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Bins, 43 M.J. 79, 85 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).
The court in Banker noted that the role of the military judge is to assure that the evidence meets
the usual evidentiary standards.
Banker, 60 M.J. at 224 (citing United States
v. Platero, 72 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1995)). The court in
Platero went on to say, “when the Judge decides whether or not a defense
is true or false and decides that on the basis of the credibility of the
witnesses, the Judge is
doing what the jury is supposed to do in a seri-
ous criminal case covered by the Sixth Amendment.”
Platero, 72 F.3d at 812.
Smith had a commonsense
explanation for SR’s claim that
the sexual activity
was nonconsensual and
the military judge’s ruling prevented
the members from considering this theory. The alleged false accusa- tion was close in time to the allegation
made
against Smith, both allegations involved military members and both situations presented
a motive for SR to lie about the consensual nature
of her sexual activities to protect her career. Putting aside the fact that M.R.E.
412 may not
even
apply to this type of evidence, I would
con- clude that the evidence should have
been admitted un- der M.R.E. 412. I would further find that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt as it essen- tially deprived Smith of his best defense and
“the ex- cluded evidence
may have tipped the credibility balance in [Smith’s]
favor.” Moss, 63 M.J. at 239.
I would reverse the decision of the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals and set aside the findings and
sentence for Additional Charge I, Specification 1
of Additional Charge II, and Additional
Charge
III, and remand the case for further proceed- ings, if any.
Read more at http://www.amazon.com/Judge-London-Steverson/e/B006WQKFJM
Labels: Cadet Webster Smith.
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